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This paper describes the balance-of-payments dominance as a growth constraint to the 
Argentinian economy and briefly characterizes the unbalanced productive structure of 
the country as its main cause. Also, understanding that under this constraint domestic 
economic cycles depend on external shocks, auto-regressive vectors are used to 
characterize the short-run impact of these shocks on GDP, trade balance, and real 
wages. 
Results confirm that there is a bottleneck in the trade balance that blocks future growth 
possibilities, that GDP and wages are highly sensitive to variations in the terms of trade, 
that the increase in external debt does not produce economic growth or improvements in 
the purchasing power of the population, and that there is a vicious dynamic between 
capital flight and foreign debt. At the same time, there is evidence of the increase in 
external vulnerability since the change in the accumulation model in the 1970s.  
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During the last decades, Argentina has grown slowly and discontinuously. The different 
accumulation regimes that followed each other have not managed to channel the country 
into a sustainable development path. Several authors argue that economic recessions in 
Argentina are directly related to the balance of payment (BoP) problems. From works 
like Diamand (1983) and Azpiazu & Nochteff (1995) to more recent ones like Lavarello 
et al. (2013), Schteingart (2016), Abeles & Valdecantos (2016), Gerchunoff & Rapetti, 
(2016), and Basualdo (2017), the common factor in the explanation is an external 
constraint.  
This growth constraint is explained by an unbalanced productive structure, which leads 
recurrently to a shortage of foreign currency (Diamand, 1983). During the state-led 
industrialization phase (1930-1975), Argentina had a primary sector that worked at 
international costs and was a foreign exchange provider, and an industrial sector, whose 
costs were higher than international ones and permanently demanded foreign currency 
to expand, since many productive inputs and capital goods were not produced locally 
due to the limited depth of the substitution process and the country's technologically 
adaptive behavior.  
Thus, every time the country grew, it inexorably entered into a trade balance deficit, 
which led to a BoP crisis (Schteingart, 2016). This process worsened via the capital 
account from the 1970s onwards when Argentina entered into a dynamic of external 
indebtedness that involved allocating more and more foreign currency to debt 
repayment (Ocampo, 2016; Basualdo, 2013). Moreover, the bottleneck worsened with 
capital outflow, which escalated from the 1990s. 
Faced with this type of growth constraint and the defenselessness it generates, the stress 
that comes from foreign economies become more relevant. Furthermore, Ocampo 
(2016) makes explicit the dependence of domestic economic cycles on external shocks - 
i.e., the influence of the BoP on the short-term macroeconomic dynamics of developing 
countries. Studies that characterize Argentina's external vulnerability identify the 
channels through which it is related to its growth, highlighting trade specialization and 
financial relationship. In this sense, variations in the terms of trade, in the growth of the 
main trading partners, and the evolution of external liabilities, take on vital relevance 




Therefore, this work aims to characterize Argentina‟s growth constraint and describe the 
short-run impact of external shocks together with certain endogenous dynamics with 
which they are related. Furthermore, considering that in the 1970s a new accumulation 
model was established, this work also pursues the objective of comparing external 
shocks' impact between the periods 1930-1976 and 1977-2018.  
For these purposes, vectors autoregression (VAR) are estimated, which provides a 
systematic way to capture rich dynamics in multiple time series (Stock and Watson, 
2001). VARs are very useful when there is evidence of simultaneity between a group of 
variables, and when their relationships are transmitted over time. This is the case of the 
interrelationship between Argentina‟s main trading partner‟s growths, the country terms 
of trade, the level of external public debt and capital outflow, and its impact on the trade 
balance, output, and real wages. The fact of including real wages in the analysis is a 
distinctive element of this work when comparing to others that study similar issues, and 
responds to the objective of knowing the impact of the shocks on the purchasing power 
and the population standard of living. 
The study of Argentina's vulnerability acquires greater relevance in the current context: 
in 2020, the country is going through its third consecutive year of recession, its ninth 
sovereign debt renegotiation and a greater concentration of its export basket in primary 
products, as warned by ECLAC (2020). Currently, it is also refinancing the loan that 
IMF provided in 2018, the largest loan package the institution has ever given (IMFc, 
2020). 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 offers a brief review of 
the existing literature on the external growth constraint in Argentina and the unbalanced 
productive structure. Also, some measures that allow characterizing it are included. 
Section 3 contains a description of variables that represent the channels through which 
external shocks impact the economy and the arising hypothesis. In Section 4, the 
research methodology is outlined by explaining the data and the vector autoregression. 
Results are presented in Section 5, both for the whole sample and for the comparison 





2. GROWTH CONSTRAINTS IN ARGENTINA 
2.1. Argentina's slow and discontinuous growth 
Not only Argentina has failed to enter a path of sustainable growth and development, 
but it has moved further and further away from it. From 1930 to the present, the 
Argentinian economy has grown for more than five consecutive years in only four 
periods: 1933-1942, 1953-1958, 1964-1974, and 2003-2008. From 1930 to 2018, the 
country has experienced 19 recessive episodes that account for 28 years of economic 
contraction: more than one recession every three years.  
Figure 1: Argentina GDP growth rates 
Source: own elaboration with Maddison Project database 
Figure 1 shows the volatility of Argentina‟s growth and, in turn, the increasing intensity 
of recessionary episodes between 1930 and 2018. However, it is important to note that 
this is not the usual behavior of South American emerging economies. Table 1 and 
Figure 33 (Appendix) show that the Argentinian case is different from that of Brazil, 
Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The performance of these economies is 
more stable, their recessive episodes are recorded less frequently and their average 
accumulated growth rates are higher. Moreover, Argentina experiences the second worst 








































































Table 1: Average accumulated GDPpc growth rates (%) and number of years of economic contraction 
South American economies 
Country 
Average accumulated growth rate  Number of years of economic 
 contraction (1930-2018) 1930-2018 1930-1976 1977-2018 
Brazil 2,44 3,67 1,01 22 
Colombia 2,04 2,03 2,06 15 
Chile 1,91 0,75 3,14 21 
Peru 1,68 2,07 1,34 25 
Uruguay 1,41 0,87 2,06 26 
Bolivia 1,14 1,35 0,87 24 
Argentina 1,13 1,51 0,66 28 
Source: own elaboration with Maddison Project database 
There are different approaches to explain the deterioration of the Argentinian economy. 
Some attribute responsibility mainly to the weight of the public sector and the fiscal 
deficit (Buera & Nicolini, 2019; di Tella & Dubra, 2010; Amado et al., 2005), while 
others focus on the lack of a healthy currency and the difficulty of capturing domestic 
savings (Taylor, 2018; Fanelli & Heymann, 2002). The institutionalist approach relates 
these explanations and argues that the country has an organizational framework that 
inhibits its future growth possibilities (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Della Paolera & Taylor, 
1999). Furthermore, some believe that the economy's main problem has been its 
inability to grow without facing an external constraint. Far from considering these 
explanations as mutually exclusive and from aspiring to monocausal elucidations, this 
paper focuses on the approach of the external constraint and the consequent relevance of 
the vulnerability to the rest of the world. 
2.2. External constraint and its causes 
The external constraint approach was first formalized by Thirlwall (1979). The author 
argues that the main constraint on an open economy to achieve a high growth rate in the 
long term is its Balance of Payments (BoP). Strictly speaking, Thirlwall‟s Law holds 
that the growth rate of open economies approaches the growth rate of the ratio of export 
growth to the income elasticity of imports. As proven in several studies this model 
approximates well the growth dynamics followed by Argentina (Gómez et al., 2007; 
Capraro, 2007). 
In the same theoretical strand, in his article entitled "The Argentinian Pendulum: Until 
When?" Diamand (1983) describes the political-economic cycle of the two currents that 
alternate in the government and concludes that none of them is intrinsically viable. He 
argues that both converge, in different ways, towards recurrent BoP crises. The author 
describes an “expansionist” or “popular” political model that aims at progressive 




provision of public goods, nominal wage increases, price controls, exchange rate 
manipulation, and public service tariffs.  
On the other hand, there is the “political-economic orthodoxy”, which has as its main 
objective the attraction of foreign capital and emphasizes discipline, order, efficiency, 
and budgetary balance. Both currents converge cyclically, in different ways, to BoP 
crises. Nevertheless, it is the latest the one that more frequently incurs unsustainable 
debt processes that imply the commitment to pay interest in foreign currency, which 
increases its demand and accentuates the “original sin” dynamic
1
 (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 2010). This contributes to the "stop and go" behavior of the economy, 
through which the path of growth itself generates the conditions for a crisis, after which 
the march of the product is resumed (Schvarzer & Tavonanska, 2008). 
What is the underlying reason that makes the two political currents that lead the country 
to arrive at these types of crises? According to Prebisch (1949), recurrent BoP crises can 
be explained by the problem of the Structural Heterogeneity, which exposes that 
productive sectors typical of economies in different stages of development coexist in 
Argentina. This thesis is analogous to that of Diamand's Unbalanced Productive 
Structures (1983), Azpiazu and Nochteff's Heterogeneous Productivity Structure (1995), 
or Schydlowsky's Evolutionary Dutch Disease (1993).  
The main characteristic of this phenomenon is that "there is a discrete gap between the 
productivity of the sector with the greatest comparative advantage and that of the sector 
with the greatest comparative disadvantage (or higher marginal costs, or lower marginal 
productivity)" (Schydlowsky, 1993). It is important to note that this type of imbalance 
cannot occur under free trade, since the existence of a sector with the greater 
comparative disadvantage is a necessary condition. In our case of analysis, the industrial 
sector, born during the Industrialization by Imports Substitution stage (ISI), suffers from 
a low enough effective exchange rates to make it difficult to compete with imports. 
Indeed, the "industrial exchange rate" (in Diamand's jargon), or Schydolowsky's 
analogous version, "the cost parity of the industrial sectors", requires a greater 
depreciation than the cost parity of the primary sectors.  
                                               
1Eichengreen and Hausmann (2010) name “original sin” the phenomena of a country that, not being 
allowed to borrow abroad in its own currency, accumulates a net debt such that it generates an aggregate 
currency mismatch on its balance sheet. Authors show that the extent to which debt is denominated in 




Azpiazu and Nochteff (1995) explain that one of the causes of the Structural 
Heterogeneity in Argentina is the historical process of local inputs integration and 
productive diversification. The productive structure formed during the first part of the 
ISI (1930-1975) worsened the comparative disadvantages of the industrial sector, 
through a protectionist bias that failed to properly encourage industrial exports. 
According to these two authors, the process of industrialization carried out was 
consistent with an adaptive economy, with technologically late-growth, in which there 
are no transformations and expansions of endogenous impulses but rather adaptations to 
exogenous impulses. The type of protectionism applied at that time was the most useful 




This is important because these two productive sectors are different in terms of their 
potential to generate growth and development. On the one hand, manufacturing sectors, 
generally add more value. This implies high increasing returns, high incidence of 
technological change and innovations, and high synergies and linkages arising from 
labor division and, therefore, strongly induce economic development. On the other 
hand, low value-added sectors typical of poor and middle-income countries have low 
R&D content, low technological innovation, and the absence of learning curves 
(Reinert, 2010). Consequently, Argentina‟s possibilities in the future are undermined.  
Also, Gala et al. (2018) argument that exports and production complexity is significant 
to explain convergence and divergence among countries. To acknowledge this, they use 
the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), a reflection of the diversification and ubiquity 
                                               
2 These authors make an analysis of the possible economic policy options that the map of social actors 
allowed at that time. They conclude that the politically and socially viable options were the “industrial 
export” and “protectionist” ones. The industrial export option, adopted by the Southeast Asian economies, 
implied combining various instruments with the objective of inducing a sustained increase in industrial 
exports. In the industrial field, the protectionist option simply involved protecting industry in the 




of countries‟ export basket
3
: the higher the economic complexity of a country, the better 
its possibilities to stimulate faster growth rates. 
According to the Atlas of Economic Complexity (2011), Argentina is in the 73rd 
position out of 133 considered countries (2018 data), and it has become less complex 
during the last 23 years (1995 is the first year for which the ECI is available), worsening 
21 positions in the ECI ranking. The country is expected to grow slowly, as it is less 
complex than expected for its income level. As can be seen in Figure 2, Argentina has 
the largest fall in economic complexity compared to the falls in MERCOSUR and 
OECD averages. 
 
Figure 2: Economic Complexity Index  
Argentina, MERCOSUR average & OECD average - 1995&2018 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from the Atlas of Economic Complexity (Hausmann et al, 2011) 
In Table 2, we can observe closely the low diversification of Argentinian exports that 
persists at present. The concentration in primary products represents more than 60% of 
the total value of trade. Moreover, ECLAC (2020) alerts that the current economic crisis 
due to COVID-19 and the consequent quarantines has intensified the concentration of 
the regional export basket in primary products. 
                                               
3 Non-ubiquitous goods can be divided into those with high technological content, which are difficult to 
produce (airplanes), and those that are highly scarce in nature (diamonds). To control for scarcity in 
nature, the ECI compares the ubiquity of the product made in a given country with the diversity of the 
exports of countries that also produce and export this good. Therefore, non-ubiquity with diversity means 
“economic complexity” (e.g. Japan produces X-ray equipment, something non-ubiquitous, and the 
country‟s export basket is highly diversified) while diversity without non-ubiquity means lack of 
economic complexity (e.g. fish, meat, fruits are ubiquitous goods that are part of diversified export 
baskets typical from Latin American countries). Moreover, non-ubiquity without diversity means lack of 

















Table 2: Trade value by sector – 2018 
Sector Relative weight in exports (%) 
Vegetable Products 26,61 
Foodstuffs 22,41 
Transportation 11,71 
Animal Products 9,59 
Metals 7,74 
Chemicals & Allied Industries 7,49 
Mineral Products 6,28 
Machinery & Electrical 2,16 
Products Plastics & Rubbers 1,99 
Raw Hides, Skins, Leather & Furs 1,46 




Source: own elaboration with data from The Observatory of Economic Complexity 
 
The Structural Heterogeneity thesis has been reinforced in more recent literature, with 
some variations. Gerchunoff and Rapetti (2016) explain that Argentina faces a structural 
distributive conflict that was born in the period 1930-1950. It is defined as the 
discrepancy between wage aspirations of workers and the wage associated with the 
productive possibilities of the economy, the latter being limited by the stagnation of the 
agricultural supply and by the low contribution of the manufacturing industry to the 
generation of foreign currencies
4
. Causes of the birth of this phenomenon can be found 
in the fall of the export value and capital outflows between 1930 and 1952, together 
with the new distribution pattern and the notion of social justice that were later 
introduced by Peronism
5
 (Gerchunoff and Rapetti, 2016). Following their theoretical 
proposal, this work analyzes Argentina‟s external vulnerability starting in 1930. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, from 1945 onwards a tendency towards an increase in the 
real wage began, whose peak was reached on the eve of the military dictatorship (1976-
1983). In line with what Gerchunoff and Rapetti indicate, in that time the real wage 
perforated a ceiling from which it would no longer fall, at least until the 2001/2002 
crisis. 
                                               
4 Authors also present the structural distributive conflict as the divergence between two levels of the real 
exchange rate (RER): the macroeconomic equilibrium RER, which allows the economy to simultaneously 
maintain full employment and a sustainable balance of payments, and the social equilibrium RER, which 
emerges when fully employed workers reach the real wage they aspire to. Imbalance occurs when the 
macroeconomic RER is significantly higher than the social equilibrium RER. 
5 Juan Domingo Perón was the founder of the Peronist movement. He was president of Argentina for 




In this paper, real wage will be used as a measure of aspects that GDP fails to represent 
on the economic and social aspects: it approximates the purchasing power and material 
welfare, which are part of the population quality of life. Greater purchasing power 
reflects access to more goods and services, which implies a higher standard of living for 
the worker and his/her family. Likewise, the higher the real salary is, the lower the 
levels of income inequality are (Castro et al., 2019).  
Figure 3: Real Wage Index 
 
Source: own elaboration with Fundación Mediterránea, Graña y Kennedy (2008) & INDEC6 database 
In addition, the dynamics of external strangulation generated by the unbalanced 
productive structure have been accentuated since the change in the accumulation model
7
 
in the mid-1970s, from which the capital account acquired a central role in generating 
cyclical shocks in emerging economies (Ocampo, 2016). The 70s were characterized by 
profound changes at the global level: the decline of the strong growth of the Second 
Postwar in developed economies, the abandonment of the gold standard, the oil shocks 
of 1973 and 1979, and financial markets progress. 
Figure 4 shows that Argentina was plunged into a strong process of indebtedness that 
involved allocating more and more foreign currency to debt repayment (the “original 
sin” problem) while destroying the industrial fabric established during the previous 
                                               
6 INDEC is the Argentina‟s National Institute of Statistics and Census  
7 It is followed the definition of Boyer (1989) of the accumulation model: “the set of regularities that 
ensure the general and relatively coherent progress of capital accumulation, that is, which allow the 


























































regime (Basualdo, 2017). In other words, during this period a new capital-account 
bottleneck was added to the traditional trade balance constraint (Ocampo, 2016).  
A policy that contributed to the accumulation model transformation was the Financial 
Reform of 1977, which aimed for the liberalization of the internal markets and greater 
involvement with international markets
8
. It negatively affected productive activities, 
encouraged speculative valorization, and produced hypertrophy in the financial sector 
(Rapoport & Guiñazú, 2016).  
Figure 4: Public External Debt in millions of dollars9 
 
Source: own elaboration with Ferreres (2005), Basualdo (2013), and ECLAC data 
It is worth highlighting the implications of the fact that the commodities that Argentina 
historically sells to the world are food. Within the theoretical framework of external 
constraint, Chena (2008) makes explicit that, even if the income elasticity of demand for 
exports increases and becomes equal to the demand for industrial imports, the country 
will continue to lag behind its trading partners in terms of the role played in its growth 
by the income elasticity of domestic demand for food. In countries with high levels of 
poverty, the income elasticity of the internal demand for food is high. This means that, 
even if the terms of trade improve, the country will suffer an external constraint. 
The seriousness of Argentina's external vulnerability has become even more evident and 
urgent in the last year when the level of external debt put its sustainability in check. 
                                               
8 The laws that comprised the Financial Reform were 21.495 and 21.526; along with 21.364, 21.547 and 
21.571, which modified the BCRA's statute. For more details on the subject, see Cibils & Allami (2010) 
and Gaba (1981). 
9 No data are available for Argentina's total (public + private) external debt for the period 1930-2018. 




























































Given the deterioration of the balance of payments, the International Monetary Fund 
itself has accepted as valid the exchange controls that the country imposed in 2019, in a 
new reading of the current situation (IMF, 2020a; IMF, 2020b). 
3. EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY 
3.1. Background 
Argentina's vulnerability has two sides: one internal and one external. So far, the 
internal side has been described, which is the unbalanced productive structure and its 
consequent effects on Argentina's growth possibilities. This implies "defenselessness, 
meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss" (Chambers, 1989). Faced with 
external shocks, the country has less capacity to deal with risks without falling into a 
BoP crisis or, even if it does not fall into a crisis, it may have less capacity to restore 
growth in recessive international contexts. This, in turn, affects the level of investment 
and further compromises future growth possibilities. 
On the other hand, the external side of vulnerability alludes to risks and stress to which 
the economy is exposed. Abeles and Valdecantos (2016) classify the channels through 
which external shocks affect the economy into two types: real and financial. The former 
refers to those determined by movements in the terms of trade and the variation of main 
trading partner‟s growth, while the financial ones refer to fluctuations in the levels of 
external liabilities. 
In this way, real external vulnerability is strongly correlated with the trade 
specialization of each country: in the face of a lower degree of productive 
diversification, the economy will be more exposed to dynamics unrelated to its 
functioning, especially in the terms of trade movements. In fact, we can observe that the 
periods in which the terms of trade (TOT) fall most sharply coincide with years of 
internal economic turbulence (Figure 5). During the period 1930-1933, TOT worsened 
considerably, contributing to the genesis of the structural distributive conflict. 
Following the identification and classification of economic crises in Argentina by 




the Terms of Trade
10.
 It is the case of TOT‟s dramatic fall between 1947 and 1958, 
which coincide with a period of 4 crisis: 1948-1949 (deep), 1950-1951 (mild), 1955 
(mild), and 1958 (very deep). The other substantial drop in the terms of trade occurs for 
the period 1974-1989, which coincide with the crisis 1975-1976 (very deep), 1981-1982 
(deep), 1983-1989 (very deep).  
Following Charnakovi and Dolado (2014), TOT affect small commodity-exporting 
economies in different ways. The “external balance effect” refers to a direct relation 
between TOT and current account balances: it is expected that when exports relative 
prices go up, revenue from exports surpasses the costs of imports, leading to the 
increase of foreign assets or a decrease of external debt. In addition, the “commodity 
currency effect” refers to the expectation of an inverse relation between TOT and real 
exchange rate (appreciation). The “spending effect” points that TOT shocks boost 
domestic demand by increasing consumption, investment, and government expenditure. 
Figure 5: Argentina‟s Terms of Trade – 1930-2018 
 
Source: own elaboration with Gerchunoff & Llach (2003) and ECLAC data 
Regarding Argentina‟s trade partners' growth, Abeles & Valdecantos (2016) explain 
that the more the country concentrates its export destinations on a few trading partners, 
the greater its external vulnerability. To acknowledge this type of vulnerability, the 
growth rate of the main trading partners weighted by exported value in each year is 
taken into account. Two criteria were followed to build the variable: represent at least 
50% of exports in each year -the average is 78,9% for the entire period- and include at 
                                               
10 Depending on the deviation from the Market Turbulent Index (MTI) -that is the sum of the change rate 
of international reserves, exchange rate and interest rate weighted by the inverse of their variability 
Amado et al.(2005) classifies Argentinian crisis in very deep (or crashes), deep and mild. MTI follows the 
idea that market pressure increases when exchange rate devaluates (rises), when interest rate increases 
























































least the first 14 export destinations of the corresponding year (see Figure 34 in the 
Appendix).  
Figure 6 shows that years of substantial fall in Argentina‟s main trading partners 
economies coincide with internal crisis: 1930-1931, a period of deep international crisis; 
1937-1938, a mild internal crisis; 1948-1949, a deep crisis with a depreciation of 
247,4% of the exchange rate; 1958, a deep crisis that implied 78% drop in the 
international reserves; 1975-1976, very deep crisis with 2.282,1% depreciation of the 
exchange rate (a hinge in the type of crisis that the country used to have) and 80,9% 
drop of the international reserves; 1981-1982, a deep crisis with 2.999,3% depreciation 
in that year; 1889-1990, the deepest crisis of the considerate period, with uncontrolled 
increases in the exchange rate (68.935,6%), interest rates and huge reserves loses; and 
2008-2009, the international financial crisis (Amado et al., 2005). 
Figure 6: Main trading partner‟s growth rate weighted by exported value  
 
Source: own elaboration with data from INDEC and Maddison project database 
As for external financial vulnerability, it depends on the degree of external 
indebtedness, including the degree of penetration of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and the foreign capital flows (Abeles and Valdecantos, 2016). As mentioned above and 
as can be seen in Figure 4, from the 1970s onwards the external debt increased 
dramatically. According to Basualdo (2013), this behavior responds to a new social 
regime of capital accumulation based on financial valorization, defined as the large 
firms‟ placement of surplus in various financial assets (securities, bonds, deposits) in 
the domestic and international markets, to the detriment of real productive investment 
which is less profitable. Financial internationalization took shape with the deregulation 



























































line with the economic model implemented by the de facto government of the military 
dictatorship. 
Regarding the FDI, Abeles and Valdecantos (2016) argue that it should be taken into 
account when analyzing the external vulnerability because, despite certain positive 
attributes FDI has vis- à -vis other sources of external financing, it implies a certain 
return that compromises the availability of foreign currency over time. Nevertheless, 
FDI is excluded from the VAR analysis in the fifth section of the thesis because of 
information availability and particularities of the FDI in Argentina. As for the first 
motive, there is no data about the FDI for the period 1930-1969, not even in secondary 
sources.  
The main reason why Abeles and Valdecantos (2016) consider FDI among the liabilities 
of Latin American economies is the high level of FDI compared to the size of the 
economies in Central America and the Caribbean. However, as can be seen in Table 3, 
the case of South American countries, and particularly the Argentinian case, is very 
different as there is a lower level of FDI penetration. For Argentina, this means less 
exposure to external shocks related to sharp increases or decreases in FDI flows. 
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment over GDP - Average per decade 11 
 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018 
Caribbean 5,59% 4,20% 5,38% 9,31% 7,43% 
Central America 7,06% 1,12% 2,25% 4,55% 4,22% 
South America 0,89% 0,71% 2,56% 3,24% 3,18% 
Argentina 0,25% 0,61% 2,39% 2,08% 1,81% 
Source: own elaboration with UNCTAD data 
Figure 7 shows the low relative importance of FDI vis-à-vis public external debt in 
Argentina: in the year of highest FDI penetration, 1999, it accounted for 4,22% of GDP, 
while public external debt represented 14,2%. 
                                               
11 Caribbean includes data from Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
and Trinidad and Tobago. Central America includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua. South America includes data from Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 




Figure 7: Argentina‟s external liabilities as GDP proportion 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from UNCTAD 
Summarizing, it is clear that in Argentina's case the need for foreign currency to pay the 
commitments that FDI may entail is of lesser relative importance than in the rest of 
Latin America and, therefore, the scarcity of information for the period under analysis 
does not represent a serious problem.  
Last but not least, another process that has aggravated the problem of external constraint 
and that exacerbates the impact of external shocks is capital flight. Basualdo (2013) 
explains that local capital flight occurs when residents of an economy remit funds 
abroad to make various investments and acquire assets that may be physical (direct 
investments) or financial (securities, shares, deposits). Basualdo and Kulfas (2000) 
describe that the formation of external assets has its genesis in Argentina in the 1970s 
with the financial reform that set in motion the economic policy of the military 
dictatorship, but becomes more complex and progressively takes shape from the 1990s 
onwards, as can be seen in Figure 8.  
It should be noted that capital outflow abroad was intrinsically linked to external 
indebtedness because the latter no longer necessary constituted a form of financing 
investment or working capital but rather an instrument for obtaining financial income, 
given that the domestic interest rate was systematically higher than the cost of external 
indebtedness in the international market. In the context of a structural shortage of 
foreign currency, external debt made the capital flight possible, by providing the 





























































Figure 8: Stock of external assets in millions of dollars– (1930-2018)12 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from Argentina’s Ministry of Finance, Basualdo (2013) and Gaggero, 
Gaggero, and Rua (2013) 
3.2. Hypothesis  
Under the consideration that the external constraint has operated during most of the 
analyzed period, and given the characterization made of the vulnerability to external 
shocks, it is expected to find evidence in favor of the positive impact on output and real 
wages of TOT positive shocks and the trade partners growth. Also, it is expected that 
increases in external public debt negatively impact GDP and real wages, while the same 
is expected for capital flight shocks. Moreover, it is awaited to find evidence in favor of 
the strangulation of the trade balance, as well as of the vicious dynamics between 
foreign debt and capital flight. Besides, external vulnerability is expectable to intensify 
between the periods 1930-1976 and 1977-2018, i.e., since the change in the 
accumulation model. 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data description 
Table 4 includes the labels and definitions of the variables used in the VAR model and 
the source from which they were obtained (see Table 11 and Figure 35 in the Appendix 
for descriptive statistics and individual graphs of the variables). The data is annual and 
covers the period 1930-2018. Since there are no official sources that have the complete 
series used here, the "backward splicing" methodology has been used to obtain 
homogeneous series of the variables. The procedure involves "stretching" the most 
                                               





























































recent series based on the rate of variation of the previous series (Graña & Kennedy, 
2008).  
Table 4: Variables 
Variable Label Operational definition Source 
GDP c_arggdp Real GDP in 2011millions of USD 
Maddison project (2018) & 
UNCTAD data base 
Real wage c_realwage Real wage index 
Fundación Mediterránea, Graña & 





Main trading partners growth rates 
weighted by the participation of 
each partner in the export basket of 
the corresponding year 




c_tot Terms of trade index  
Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) and 




Exports minus Imports in millions 
of USD 




Balance of external public debt in 
millions of USD 
Ferreres (2005), ECLAC database, 




Funds remitted abroad obtained by 
the BoP Residual Method in 
millions of USD 
Argentina‟s Economic Ministry 
database, Basualdo (2013) & 
Gaggero et al. (2013) 
Considering the dependence of domestic economic cycles on external shocks - i.e., the 
influence of the balance of payments on the short-term macroeconomic dynamics of 
developing countries (Ocampo, 2016) - the focus is on the interrelation between the 
variable‟s cycles. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied to variables for this purpose. It 
consists of a linear filter that breaks down the time series into two components: the 
long-term trend and a stationary cycle (the fluctuations around the long-term trend)
14
.  
Studying a variety of macroeconomic time series, Hodrick & Prescott (1997) found that 
the nature of the movements of cyclical components is very different from that of 
slowly varying components. The cyclical part, understood as trend deviations, has 
approximately zero mean over the long term. This contributes to the stationary nature of 
the series, which indicates that the probability distributions are stable over time 
(Wooldridge, 2013).  
In her study of Argentinian economic cycles, Cerro (1999) found that the average length 
of the cycles between 1920 and 1998 is 3,33 years. While the amplitude of the 
Argentinian cycle phases is greater than in the cases of the US, UK, and Australia, the 
                                               
13 INDEC is the Argentina‟s National Institute of Statistics and Census  
14 The filter requires previous specification of a parameter λ that tunes the smoothness of the trend, and 
depends on the periodicity of the data. For annual data, as it corresponds in this case, a lambda of 100 is 




duration is lower, which implies that the country has more cycles per period. This is 
consistent with Ocampo's thesis regarding the dependence of the domestic cycle on 
external shocks and the consequent economic volatility.  
4.2. Research methodology: Autoregressive vectors 
To describe the impact of external shocks and certain endogenous dynamics with which 
they are related, a VAR analysis is performed with EViews 7. A VAR is an 
autoregressive vector-type model used to characterize simultaneous interactions 
between groups of variables. One of the main features of this framework is that it 
provides a systematic way to capture rich dynamics in multiple time series (Stock and 
Watson, 2001), and therefore it helps to avoid monocausal and simplistic explanations. 
The vector autoregressive for a set of   variables is of the form: 
      ∑       
 
   
    (1) 
where    is a       vector of variables,    is a       matrix that contains the structural 
coefficients that relate the current and past values of the endogenous,    is a       
vector of innovations in each variable, and            . 
We assume that the covariance matrix of the    innovations of the VAR model,   , is 
diagonal, i.e., the innovations associated to different variables have zero covariance, 
since the correlation between the different variables is being collected by the presence 
of each one of those variables in the equation of the other variable in the structural 
model:                 . 
To obtain the reduced form (RF) it is necessary to perform the following operation: 
   ∑  
         
 
   
   
     (2) 
which leads to the form that best summarizes the parameters that are searched, i.e.:  
   ∑       
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This model could be consistently estimated by OLS regressions equation by equation 
since endogenous variables are only a function of predetermined variables and do not 
present endogeneity problems, as they have no correlation with the shocks:      
                          
However, an identification strategy is required to recover the response of the variables 
to structural innovations. Identifying the model consists of finding numerical values for 
the elements of the    matrix that defines the transformation      
    . 
The empirical model here is identified using Cholesky decomposition which imposes 
the restriction that matrix    is lower triangular with unit diagonal elements. This 
decomposition allows obtaining a transformed model with unrelated innovations and 
unitary variances. New innovations,   , are obtained by keeping the residuals of the 
regressions of each    innovation over all those that precede it within the   vector: 
        , 
         ̂     , 
         ̂        ̂    ,… 
… 
          ̂      ̂          ̂           
 
(4) 
Therefore, the first innovation,    , is equal to    . The second innovation,    , is the 
residual of the OLS regression of     on    , and so on. By construction, the residuals of 
linear OLS regressions are uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables, so the 
innovations    ,    , ...,     are uncorrelated (Novales, 2011). 
The process introduces an ordering of variables, as it gives the transformed error terms a 
different relevance. This means that the first variable cannot respond to 
contemporaneous shocks (within the year) of any other variables, while the second 
variable can respond to contemporaneous shocks in the first variable but not in the 
subsequent variables, and so on. 
Contemporaneous restrictions on the responses of the variables listed in Table 4 are 
imposed, for which Cholesky factorization is used. The main trading partners‟ growth 
rates and the terms of trade are ordered in the first place, respectively. Therefore, they 
cannot be contemporaneously affected by the subsequent variables, which make sense 
since Argentina is a price-accepting country of the products it sells to the rest of the 





These two variables are followed by GDP, Balance of Trade, External public debt, 
Capital outflow, and Real wage. Considering that the result of the trade balance is a part 
of GDP, it comes right after it in the ordering. Both the external debt and the Capital 
outflow variables are expected to depend on the country's economic performance and its 
trade surplus or deficit. The external debt preceded the capital outflow in the ordering 
following the idea that a large proportion of the debt incurred made it possible for those 
capitals to leave. Real wage is placed at the end, as it is one of the variables that adjust 
most quickly
15
, so it can respond contemporaneously to any variable. In any case, it is 
corroborated that none of the main results discussed below vary significantly from 
changes in the order of the variables (see Table 12 in the Appendix). 
Standard practice in VAR analysis is to report the results of Granger-causality tests, 
impulse responses, and variance decomposition. From the reduced form VAR, Granger 
causality contrast examines whether past values of a given variable help predict the 
behavior of another variable. From the recursive VAR, accumulated impulse response 
functions (AIRF) and variance decomposition are obtained. AIRF measures the sum of 
each variable's reaction to innovation in one variable across time. They are represented 
in several graphs, each of which includes the accumulated responses over time of a 
given variable to an impulse in each of the innovations. In turn, the decomposition of 
the variance allows us to divide the variance of the prediction error of each variable into 
the components that are attributable to the different shocks that the system may 
experience (Novales, 2011). 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Full sample: 1930-2018 
Based on the Akaike information criterion, a three-lag VAR is performed, which is the 
least possible amount of lags that eliminates residual autocorrelation
16
. The system does 
                                               
15 This is particularly important for a country with an inflationary tradition like Argentina. It is true that 
the nominal wage crosses institutional barriers that slow down its reaction, but the inflation component 
makes it respond more quickly. 
16 The autocorrelation LM test, performed to check for serial correlation in the residuals up to the third 
lag, has a p-value of 0,0985 that indicates no serial correlation at 5% significance level. Also, the Jarque-
Bera residual normality test is performed, but a p-value=0,000 indicates that jointly the residuals in the 
VAR system are not normally distributed. Nevertheless, the non-normality of the residuals, while not 
desirable, does not represent problems for the consistency of the estimators and allows for inference in an 
asymptotic sense. White heteroscedasticity LM test is also performed, and with a p-value=0,0888 the null 




not have unit roots in the characteristic polynomial, so it satisfies the stability condition. 
This implies that when a dependent variable experiences a shock it returns to 
equilibrium over time.  
Table 2 presents the results of the Granger-Causality tests. It shows the p-values 
associated with the F-statistics for testing whether the relevant sets of coefficients are 
zero, i.e. that lags of the variable in the row labeled “Regressor” do not enter the 
reduced form equation for the column variable labeled “Dependent Variable”. In bold 
are indicated p-values that allow rejecting the null hypothesis of the regressor not 
causing, in Granger's sense, the dependent variable.  
At first glance, it can be seen that both the terms of trade and the growth of main trading 
partners helps to predict the real wage at the 5 percent significance level. Trade Balance 
helps to predict GDP, and both GDP and Trade Balance help predict the External Public 
Debt level. Real Wage, GDP, and External Public Debt level help predict Capital 
Outflow.  
Table 5: Granger-causality tests 
Regressor 
Dependent variable in regression 
c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_ko  c_realwage  
c_tradepartn x 0,004 0,328 0,345 0,910 0,661 0,032 
c_tot 0,544 x 0,347 0,175 0,685 0,607 0,006 
c_arggdp 0,296 0,764 x 0,135 0,002 0,013 0,877 
c_tb 0,231 0,271 0,002 x 0,001 0,206 0,546 
c_fordebt 0,887 0,972 0,477 0,626 x 0,009 0,393 
c_ko 0,132 0,831 0,133 0,378 0,914 x 0,456 
 c_realwage  0,666 0,602 0,845 0,643 0,737 0,027 x 
All 0,594 0,042 0,004 0,275 0,000 0,001 0,056 
A subset of key impulse responses is reported in the text and the complete set of AIRF 
are reported in Figure 36 in the Appendix. The shock of each variable is set as one 
standard deviation of that variable and the accumulated responses are traced through ten 
periods. The red dotted lines represent confidence bands obtained from Montecarlo 
simulations. 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 present output responses to shocks in trade partner‟s growth and 
the terms of trade, respectively
17
. As it is expected, both responses are positive, 
although 10 years after the TOT shock the cumulative GDP response is almost 50% 
                                               
17 By way of example: a standard deviation in the case of the trade partner growth series is 1,41 percent, 
which is equivalent to the movement of the variable in the year 1968; in the case of the TOT, the shock is 




higher than the cumulative response to the other shock (first two columns of Table 6). 
This result is consistent with the fact that TOT influence both exports and imports, 
while the growth of other economies is only a determinant of exports. Nevertheless, 
GDP reaction to TOT is slower. It is only between the third and fourth post-shock 
period that the accumulated effects are equalized. 
Among the effects that Charnakovi and Dolado (2014) point out that TOT can have on 
economic performance, there is evidence in favor of the "spending effect" and/or of the 
“commodity currency effect”. It happens that either its increase pushes the aggregate 
demand through increases in consumption, investment and public spending, and/or its 
increase causes the fall of the real exchange rate (appreciation), increasing the 
competitiveness of the economy and its final product. 
Unlike what Lanteri (2009) finds for the long term, there does not seem to be an 
"external balance effect" in the short term: as it can be seen in the second column of 
Table 6, BoT reaction to TOT shock is negative, although TOT movements explain 7,5 
percent of the variance in the BoT (see Table 6 and Figure 36 in Appendix). In the case 
of external debt, the reaction to TOT shock changes direction intermittently, although 
the accumulated effect from the fourth to the tenth period is only positive during two of 
those years (see Figure 36 in the Appendix) and the accumulated response after ten 
years is negative.  
According to the description of the "external balance effect" by Charnakovi and Dolado 
(2014), the mechanisms that would not be operating for the effect to occur would be 
related to a marginal propensity to consume higher than the unit, which would absorb a 
significant part of the increase and prevent savings from growing and its subsequent 
effect on investment. It could also be the case that the impediments are in that last part 
of this mechanism and that are related to problems in the economy to save, or it may 
simply be the case that the period considered is not sufficient for it to occur. In any case, 
Lanteri (2009) argues that recent work has shown that the "external balance effect" 




Figure 9: The response of GDP to a shock in the Main 
trading partners growth 
  
Figure 10: The response of GDP to a shock in the Terms of 
Trade  
 
Figure 11: The response of Real Wage to a shock in the 
Main trading partners growth 
 
Figure 12: The response of Real Wage to a shock in the 
Terms of Trade 
 
 
Such external shocks also have a positive impact on real wages. Figure 11 and Figure 
12 represent the Real wage response to the growth of the main trading partners and 
TOT, respectively. Moreover, both variables cause real wages in Granger's sense, and 
the positive response to these impulses indicates that shocks coming from abroad allow 
for the external constraint to relax and improve living standards. Nevertheless, only the 
reaction of real wages to TOT shocks is positive throughout the entire analysis period. 
In Table 7 it is noticeable that at the 10-year horizon, 16,27% of the Real Wage variance 
is explained by the Terms of trade, while 7,41% is explained by the Trade Partners 
growth.  
Both Real wage and GDP responses would be consistent with the fact that the main 
channel of real external vulnerability affecting Argentina is the TOT, since its main 
problem is the low diversity and complexity of its exports (and therefore its dependence 
on TOT) and not so much its export concentration in a few destinations (Abeles and 
Valdecantos, 2016). These results are also consistent with a low-income elasticity of 
exports –typically from economies specializing in low-value-added products (Zack & 




Moreover, if we compare the elasticity of GDP and real wages with respect to shocks in 
the growth of trading partners- 1,18% and 0,72% respectively
18
- we find that, in the 
short run, there is some endogenous relationship between domestic variables that 
prevent the impulse given to Argentina's economic growth from being entirely 
transferred to the real wage.  
Table 6: Accumulated impulse responses after ten years 
 
Variable that suffers the shock 
c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_ko  c_realwage  
c_tradepartn 0,008 -0,001 0,001 -0,004 0,001 0,000 0,000 
c_tot 0,046 13,586 -1,527 6,704 -2,621 -2,956 0,922 
c_arggdp 4.279,26 8.607,42 17.708,02 26.801,57 -2.362,36 -9.650,15 4.421,66 
c_tb -813,56 -797,15 -1.571,15 630,08 208,56 717,13 196,83 
c_fordebt 1.233,80 -1.007,04 -0,823 -10.195,41 5.984,70 1.610,96 -1.074,35 
c_ko 1.037,87 -272,39 2.001,44 959,58 2.183,94 2.684,41 413,56 
c_realwage  0,522 1,701 5,098 3,766 -2,216 -0,231 5,844 
Figure 13 illustrates that real wages shocks positively impact GDP after ten years, 
although the effect is vague (as can be seen in Figure 13, the effect becomes positive 
eight years after the shock). Nevertheless, there is a compelling positive and persistent 
effect of GDP on real wages. 
Figure 13:The response of GDP to a shock in the 
Real Wage 
 
Figure 14: The response of Real Wage to a 
shock in GDP 
 
So far, it has been shown that the growth of trade partners and the increase in the terms 
of trade have a net positive effect on the Argentinian economy. However, the BoT 
shows the external bottleneck that occurs when the economy grows: as can be seen in 
                                               
18 GDP sensibility measures are calculated as the ratio between GDP accumulated response to a shock in 
c_tradepartn after ten years as a percentage of GDP average level (363.489.756.437 USD). Accumulated 
responses after ten years can be seen in Table 6. The other percentages for the full sample are calculated 




Figure 15, when Argentina begins to grow, it automatically activates the mechanisms 
that block its future growth possibilities by increasing imports faster than exports.  
BoT reaction is also consistent with Chena‟s proposal: when GDP increases in countries 
with high poverty levels that sell food to the rest of the world, part of the supply is 
consumed internally, which makes exports fall (or grow beneath its possibilities). Also, 
it is noted that almost 20% of the Trade Balance variance is explained by GDP at the 
10-year time horizon, indicating the persistence of the aforementioned mechanisms 
(Table 7).  
Figure 15: The response of the Balance of Trade to a shock in GDP 
 
Regarding the variables that proxy external financial vulnerability, reaction to external 
debt shocks is analyzed. In a virtuous scheme, a country would take on external debt to 
expand its productive capacity, with which at least one or two years after the shock of 
the increase in debt, a boost in economic activity would be expected. Figure 16 
indicates that far from contributing to growth in the short term, the external public debt 
does the opposite: ten years after a 7.849 million USD increase in public external debt 
output drops 23.362,36 million USD. This is consistent with external debt not 
necessarily constituting a form of financing investment or working capital, at least until 
the 10
th
 period after the shock. Moreover, External Debt explains a low proportion of 
GDP variance -2,81% after ten years- (Table 7).  
Table 7: Variance Decomposition from the Recursive VAR after ten years 
 
 
c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_ko c_realwage 
c_tradepartn 75,06 11,32 8,88 5,78 2,10 2,70 7,41 
c_tot 4,10 69,40 6,85 7,51 1,28 0,61 16,27 
c_arggdp 5,39 5,56 42,28 27,66 6,49 12,03 18,53 
c_tb 3,74 6,93 29,84 52,37 39,83 25,45 3,36 
c_fordebt 3,63 3,15 2,57 1,85 41,64 14,49 5,82 
c_ko 6,30 2,02 6,35 1,95 3,22 37,95 1,30 
 c_realwage  1,78 1,62 3,24 2,87 5,45 6,76 47,31 




In the case of increased capital flight, the response in GDP fall is even more pronounced 
and persistent over time, as the de-capitalization of an economy blocks its future growth 
possibilities (Figure 17). 10 years after an increase in the stock of capital outflow 
equivalent to 4.266 million USD, the effect on GDP is a drop equivalent to 2,73 percent 
of the average GDP value. As Taylor (2018) highlights, lower capital accumulation 
corresponds to low saving rates, which increases the proportion of low-quality 
investment, the misallocation of it, and input price distortions (investment variety).  
Figure 16: The response of GDP to a shock in the 
External Public Debt 
 
Figure 17: The response of GDP to a shock in the Capital 
Outflow 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the Real Wage reaction to shocks in the External Public 
Debt and the Capital Outflow, respectively. Like in the GDP response, in Figure 18 it 
can be seen that Real wage reacts negatively to shocks in the External public debt, 
accumulating a fall of 2,21 basis points ten years after the shock. Comparing the 
elasticity of output and real wages with respect to external debt, there is a greater 
sensitivity of the real wage to increases in debt: in the case of the former, the elasticity 
is equivalent to -17,35 percent, while in the latter it is equivalent to -13,98%. In the case 
of the reaction to the capital outflow, although wages are less sensitive to it than to the 
external debt, the net effect is a drop equivalent to 0,231 basis points (Table 6).  
Figure 18: The response of Real Wage to a shock in the 
External Public Debt 
 
Figure 19: The response of Real Wage to a shock in the 
Capital Outflow 
 
Figure 20 shows the negative dynamics between the increase in external debt and 




outflow increases. This constitutes evidence in favor of the phenomena that Basualdo 
(2013) describes which consists of external debt making capital flight possible in a 
context of a structural shortage of foreign currency, by providing it. 
Figure 20: The response of the Capital Outflow to External Public Debt 
 
In summary, it can be seen that the growth of trading partners and improvements in the 
terms of trade positively affect output and real wages. Moreover, comparing both 
effects, it is confirmed that the Argentinian economy is relatively more sensitive to 
variations in the TOT. In the short term, the positive effects of TOT are channeled 
whether through an increase in aggregate demand and/or through real exchange rate 
variations. Also, there is evidence of the Trade balance bottleneck, which imposes 
structural constraints on growth.  
In the area of external financial vulnerability, not only it is confirmed that in the short 
term external debt does not promote growth, but that it produces the opposite. It also 
manifests negative effects on real wages. Capital flight also has a sustained negative 
impact on growth. Furthermore, there is evidence in favor of the capital flight vicious 
cycle, since it consumes borrowed dollars that the country needs, which contributes to 
the de-capitalization of the economy. 
5.2. Period’s comparison: 1930-1975 & 1977-2018 
From the aforementioned change in the accumulation model that took place in 
Argentina in the 1970s, the question arises as to whether this affected the country's 
external vulnerability. In order to compare the short-run impact of external shocks on 
the Argentinian economy in the periods 1930-1976 and 1977-2018, a VAR is made for 
each of them. The results indicate substantial changes in the impact of shocks, which 




Since it is not possible to replicate the same VAR as the original for the sample sizes 
that result from period division, some modifications are applied
19
. A recursive VAR(1) 
is configured for six variables:  
   [                                                     ] 
The order of the variables is the one shown in the    vector, following the same criteria 
for the whole sample. LM-tests indicate that there is no autocorrelation in the 
residuals
20
. Also, the systems do not have unit roots in the characteristic polynomial, so 
it satisfies the stability condition. 
Table 8: Granger Causality test. Comparison between periods 
Regressor 
Dependent variable in regression 
c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt  c_realwage  
c_tradepartn 
1930-1976 x 0,000 0,054 0,206 0,998 0,046 
1977-2018 x 0,463 0,789 0,165 0,455 0,616 
c_tot 
1930-1976 0,132 x 0,526 0,882 0,955 0,007 
1977-2018 0,342 x 0,099 0,014 0,685 0,616 
c_arggdp 
1930-1976 0,056 0,030 x 0,058 0,795 0,050 
1977-2018 0,294 0,232 x 0,912 0,092 0,268 
c_tb 
1930-1976 0,145 0,293 0,143 x 0,215 0,000 
1977-2018 0,786 0,005 0,214 x 0,175 0,469 
c_fordebt 
1930-1976 0,292 0,789 0,012 0,587 x 0,536 
1977-2018 0,676 0,974 0,271 0,520 x 0,623 
c_realwage 
1930-1976 0,077 0,285 0,119 0,100 0,207 x 
1977-2018 0,748 0,029 0,219 0,373 0,558 x 
 
In Figure 21 and Figure 22Figure 22, it can be seen that GDP response to shocks in the 
main trading partners‟ growth becomes stronger in the second sub-period, indicating 
higher real external vulnerability. Not only the cumulative response is greater in the 
second period (Table 9), but also partner‟s growth explains more of the variability of 
GDP in the second sub-sample (third row in Table 10). The GDP elasticity with respect 
to main partners' growth goes from 0,03 percent to 0,13 percent in the period 1977-
                                               
19 If for the new sample sizes the same VAR as in the previous section would be applied -7 variables and 
3 lags-, there would be unit roots in the characteristic polynomial. The stability condition for a VAR of 
those seven variables is only met by establishing a VAR (1), which has correlation in the residuals. 
Therefore, it is chosen to drop the variable Capital Outflow, since it is the one that later begins to have 
notable movements (from the 90's) 
20 Autocorrelation LM test is performed for each VAR: for the 1930-1976 VAR, p-value of LM-Statistic 
is 0,373, not allowing rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. For the 1977-2018 VAR, p-






. In addition, there is evidence of a greater persistence of the effect in the second 
sub-period. 
Figure 21: First sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in the main trading partners growth 
 
Figure 22: Second sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in the main trading partners growth 
 
Figure 23: First sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in TOT 
 
Figure 24: Second sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in TOT 
 
In the case of GDP response to shocks in the Terms of trade (Figure 23 and Figure 24), 
the increased sensitivity is even greater. Not only the response in the short term is larger 
but also the positive reaction in the following periods along with its persistence after 10 
years. The GDP elasticity with respect to TOT goes from a 14,28 percent to a 38,19 
percent in the period 1977-2018.  
These results are indicative of the end of the ISI stage and the beginning of an era of 
greater trade openness, with the corresponding increase in real external vulnerability 
that this naturally implies. As Ocampo (2016) explains, during the ISI stage, the major 
macroeconomic policy instruments were focused on managing external shocks, 
especially those coming from the current account. During the trade and financial 
liberalization stage, many instruments were abandoned, except for the exchange rate, 
                                               
21 Both sensibility measures are calculated as the ratio between GDP accumulated response to a shock in 
Trade Partner‟s growth after ten years weighted by GDP average in that period multiplied by the trade 
partner‟s standard deviation also weighted by its average. Descriptive statistics of the variables used can 
be found in Table 11 in the Appendix. Accumulated responses after ten years can be seen in Table 9. The 




which became increasingly flexible to accommodate external shocks coming through 
the capital account.  
In relation to the shocks in the TOT, it is also noteworthy the disappearance of the 
"external balance effect" from one period to another. As can be seen in Table 8, 
between 1930 and 1976, the increase in the TOT produced a sharp fall in the foreign 
debt, while it would negatively affect the Trade Balance. Between 1977 and 2018, the 
"external balance effect" disappears: TOT shocks increase the level of external debt and 
impacts more negatively than before on the outcome of the trade balance (see Figure 37 
and Figure 38 of the Appendix, and Table 9). Moreover, in the second sub-period TOT 
causes Trade balance in Granger‟s sense.  
Table 9: Accumulated impulse responses after ten years. 1930-1976 & 1977-2018 
 c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_realwage 
Response of Trade Partners to a shock in   
First sub-sample 0,014 -0,007 -0,007 -0,008 0,013 0,004 
Second sub-sample 0,007 0,000 -0,004 -0,003 0,003 0,003 
Response of TOT to a shock in   
First sub-sample 14,405 20,948 4,025 0,947 -0,867 -0,374 
Second sub-sample 4,650 8,249 -0,783 6,539 -0,514 4,149 
Response of GDP to a shock in   
First sub-sample 3.715,20 2.983,66 9.580,61 5.270,03 -7.981,78 -250,55 
Second sub-sample 43.155,77 14.934,00 29.242,52 34.632,97 -12.788,46 -8.582,71 
Response of Trade Balance to a shock in  
First sub-sample -119,41 -10,53 -237,82 177,28 66,48 -60,98 
Second sub-sample -2.770,11 -2487,81 -3.770,43 891,95 1.480,27 356,97 
Response of External Debt to a shock in:  
First sub-sample -58,77 -175,24 -392,07 -647,99 972,90 -115,34 
Second sub-sample -7474,10 641,39 -4734,41 -14316,24 18535,71 2833,78 
Response of Real Wage to a shock in: 
First sub-sample 4,175 3,955 4,820 5,314 -3,633 3,846 
Second sub-sample 6,196 4,533 6,163 5,758 -4,641 9,881 
 
Furthermore, the response of real wages to shocks in the growth of trading partners and 
TOT also constitutes evidence of increased real external vulnerability in the second sub-
period. The elasticity of real wages with respect to the growth of trade partners goes 
from 6,19 percent in the period 1930-1976 to 7,97 percent in the following period. In 
the case of the reaction to TOT shocks, as can be seen in the last row of In relation to 
the shocks in the TOT, it is also noteworthy the disappearance of the "external balance 
effect" from one period to another. As can be seen in Table 8, between 1930 and 1976, 
the increase in the TOT produced a sharp fall in the foreign debt, while it would 
negatively affect the Trade Balance. Between 1977 and 2018, the "external balance 




negatively than before on the outcome of the trade balance (see Figure 37 and Figure 38 
of the Appendix, and Table 9). Moreover, in the second sub-period TOT causes Trade 
balance in Granger‟s sense.  
Table 9, Real wage becomes more sensitive to changes in TOT. Nevertheless, they 
explain a lower proportion of wages variance after ten years.  
Figure 25: First sub-sample. Real wage response to 
a shock in the Main trading partners „growth 
 
Figure 26: Second sub-sample. Real wage response 
to a shock in the Main trading partners „growth 
 
Figure 27: First sub-sample. Real wage response to 
a shock in TOT 
 
Figure 28: Second sub-sample. Real wage response 
to a shock in TOT 
 
In Table 9 it can be seen that the bottleneck that occurs in the trade balance when the 
output grows persists in both periods. However, if the comparison is done with the 
elasticities of the Trade Balance with respect to GDP for both periods, it can be seen 
that the sensitivity of the former is lower in the second period. Nevertheless, as can be 
seen in Table 10, in this second period, the GDP explains a greater portion of the 
variability in the Trade Balance.  
Another important change between the two sub-periods is found in the reaction to 
movements in the level of external public debt. Both GDP and Real wages maintain the 
negative relationship with the external debt that was observed with the full sample, but  
while the sensitivity of the GDP to changes in the debt does not suffer great variations 
between the two sub-periods, the negative reaction of the real wage to the debt shock is 
strongly intensified. Real wage elasticity with respect to external public debt goes from 




worsened the vicious circle in which taking on foreign debt has no correlation with 
improving living standards. 
Figure 29: First sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in External Debt 
 
Figure 30: Second sub-sample. GDP response to a 
shock in External Debt 
 
Figure 31: First sub-sample. Real wage response 
to a shock in External Debt 
 
Figure 32: Second sub-sample. Real wage response 
to a shock in External Debt 
 
Table 10: Variance decomposition after ten years. 1930-1976 & 1977-2018 
 c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_realwage 
Percentage of the variance of c_tradepartn due to:   
First sub-sample 69,987 9,763 2,553 6,944 5,616 5,136 
Second sub-sample 88,523 1,463 5,492 1,273 1,338 1,911 
Percentage of the variance of c_tot due to:   
First sub-sample 28,977 64,848 2,578 2,068 0,187 1,342 
Second sub-sample 6,413 67,405 0,177 16,504 0,158 9,343 
Percentage of the variance of c_arggdp due to:   
First sub-sample 11,496 8,689 53,573 9,554 13,951 2,737 
Second sub-sample 30,638 8,484 37,030 18,453 3,583 1,812 
Percentage of the variance of c_tb due to:   
First sub-sample 10,837 4,501 16,026 65,423 0,446 2,767 
Second sub-sample 11,421 12,618 31,610 40,893 2,428 1,030 
Percentage of the variance of c_fordebt due to:   
First sub-sample 0,594 2,070 9,897 25,336 61,028 1,075 
Second sub-sample 8,723 0,959 6,239 19,192 64,009 0,878 
Percentage of the variance of c_realwage due to: 
First sub-sample 11,255 16,219 21,338 27,965 3,016 20,207 





In summary, the comparison between periods highlights the increase in real external 
vulnerability in the period 1977-2018, that is, the greater intensity of the short-term 
impact that the growth of trade partners and the terms of trade generate on both product 
and real wages. 
The disappearance of the "external balance effect" in the second period is also 
noteworthy, indicating that movements in the terms of trade lose power over both the 
trade balance and the level of external public debt. This, together with the fact that the 
shocks in the level of debt accentuate their negative effect on real wages in the second 
period, indicates that foreign debt is moving away from being a mechanism that serves 






The Argentinian economy grows slowly and discontinuously: from 1930 to 2018, the 
country experienced 28 years of economic contraction, i.e. more than one recession 
every three years. In the attempt to understand the country's poor economic 
performance, Chambers' notion of vulnerability has been used in this work (1989), 
which implies that Argentina‟s vulnerability has an internal and an external side. The 
former refers to the defenselessness of the country's economy, while the latter alludes to 
exposition to external shocks. 
The first objective of this thesis has been to describe the internal side of vulnerability, 
explained from the perspective of the balance-of-payments constraint. Several authors 
stress that the existence of an unbalanced productive structure leads the country to a 
recurrent shortage of foreign currency that limits growth possibilities, both in the long 
and in the short term. The unbalanced productive structure proposition implies that there 
are two productive sectors with a discrete gap of productivities. In the Argentinian case, 
this was born with the protectionist bias during the ISI stage (1930-1975). On the one 
hand, the country has a primary sector that works at international costs and is a foreign 
exchange provider. On the other hand, it has an industrial sector, which costs are higher 
than international ones and permanently demands foreign exchange to expand, since 
many productive inputs and capital goods are not produced locally due to the limited 
depth of the substitution process and the country's technologically adaptive behavior.  
The balance-of-payments dominance worsens with the change in the accumulation 
model from the 1970s onwards, when the country incurred a process of indebtedness 
that involved allocating more and more foreign currency to debt repayment, adding to 
the pre-existing problem a new bottleneck in the capital account. Furthermore, this is 
aggravated by the strong capital outflow that began in the 1990s, a process that not only 
contributed to the de-capitalization of the country but also implied the absorption of a 
large part of the foreign currency that was entering the country via external debt. 
Under a balance-of-payments dominance scheme, domestic economic cycles depend on 
external shocks, which constitute the other side of Argentina's economic vulnerability. 
Therefore, the second objective of this thesis has been describing the country‟s reaction 
to these shocks. For this purpose, autoregressive vectors have been used, as they 




describe the intricate relationship between cycles of Argentina‟s main trading partner‟s 
growth, the country terms of trade, the level of external public debt and capital outflow, 
and its impact on the trade balance, output, and real wages. 
There are several interesting findings. Firstly, the interrelationship in the cyclical 
movements of the variables shows that the trade balance bottleneck is confirmed for the 
short-run, and it operates throughout the entire period although in the second sub-period 
(1977-2018) it relaxes slightly. This means that, given the country‟s trade 
specialization, when Argentina begins to grow, it automatically activates the 
mechanisms that block its future growth possibilities by increasing imports faster than 
exports.  
Secondly, it is shown that GDP reacts positively to shocks in TOT and the trade 
partner‟s growth, and it is observed that it responds more intensively to the first of these 
two shocks. In addition, there is evidence of the positive effect that these shocks have 
on people's purchasing power and material well-being. It is possible that the TOT-Real 
wage relationship is mediated by the appreciation of the exchange rate, and by its use as 
an inflationary anchor. Concerning the channels through which TOT push economic 
growth, it should be noted that in the analysis of the entire sample, the direct 
relationship between the variables could be a sign in favor of the "spending effect" and 
the "commodity-currency effect", although there is evidence against the "external 
balance effect": the terms of trade increase does not improve the balance of the trade 
neither reduce the level of debt. However, by splitting the sample in two, evidence of 
the "external balance effect" is found for the first period, which then disappears between 
1977 and 2018.  
Thirdly, the real external vulnerability i.e., the one related to the country's commercial 
specialization, increases between periods which is consistent with the beginning of a 
stage of trade and financial liberalization and abandonment of protection measures 
against external shocks. This is especially notable in the greater sensitivity of output to 
TOT shocks in the second sub-period, which is also coherent with an increasingly 
concentrated export basket, reflecting the persistence of the unbalanced productive 
structure and its effects on Argentina's economic performance. 
Fourthly, it is verified that the increase of the external public debt not only does not 




sovereign debt crises that the country has had forces the assumption that in the long 
term it will not do so either. It should be noted that the effect of the foreign debt is even 
worse on the real wage. When comparing this effect between sub-periods, it can be seen 
that the results of external debt shocks do not change much for the GDP, although they 
do for the real wage. In other words, between 1977 and 2018, not only debt continues to 
be a recessive lever, but it corrodes the material possibilities of the population more and 
more. 
Fifthly, it can be seen that in the short term external public debt is providing the 
necessary foreign currency to move capitals abroad. This, together with the fact of 
capital outflow negatively affecting output, seriously worsens the external front in a 
scheme of balance-of-payments dominance. At the same time, this result is related to 
the increased sensitivity of the real wage to financial shocks, since generally the 
processes of foreign debt financing capital flight end in crises and major depreciations 
that, through their inflationary effect, corrode the real wage. 
Summarizing, the impacts of external shocks on GDP, trade balance, and real wages 
have been described and the hypotheses have been proven. Likewise, comparing results 
between periods, the increase in real and financial external vulnerability is confirmed: 
the former is verified both for GDP and real wage, and the latest for real wage. At the 
same time, these results are indicative of a change in the accumulation model between 
the two sub-periods compared, understood as the set of regularities that shape the 
process of capital accumulation. 
Therefore, Argentina has the complex challenge of diversifying its export basket to 
break the bottleneck it still has in the trade balance and to protect itself from external 
shocks. Likewise, the country will have to build the participative social monitoring 
mechanisms that will allow it to correctly direct the funds it obtains from borrowing 
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Figure 33: GDP growth rates - Selected South American economies (1930-2018) 
Panel A: Brazil Panel B: Uruguay 
  





































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 35: Variables included in VAR 
Original series Cycle 
Trade Partners 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics 
  
c_tradepartn c_tot c_arggdp c_tb c_fordebt c_ko c_realwage 
Mean value  
(original series) 
1930-2018 2,088 125,454 363.489,756 1.231,584 29.541,099 5.163 72,297 
1930-1976 0,025 138,506 183958,312 115,763 1225,297 206 67,448 
1977-2018 0,016 110,847 564393,992 2480,240 61244,019 10.592 77,724 
Standard deviation 
(cycles) 
1930-2018 1,414 12,530 22.395,21 2.614,119 7.848,997 4.266,315 7,694 
1930-1976 1,716 15,727 6.651,062 389,352 380,242 257,893 1,716 
1977-2018 0,994 7,680 32.044,442 3.807,476 11.491,691 6.242,642 0,994 
 
Table 12: VARs with different ordering of variables and fulfillment of hypotheses 
Order of variables in each VAR 
Hypothesis 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 
1.c_tot 2.c_tradepartn 3.c_realwage 4.c_arggdp 5.c_tb 6.c_fordebt 7.c_ko  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1.c_tradepartn 2.c_tot 3.c_arggdp 4.c_tb 5.c_fordebt 6.c_ko 7.c_realwage ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1.c_tot 2.c_tradepartn 3.c_tb 4.c_arggdp 5.c_fordebt 6.c_ko 7.c_realwage ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ X* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1.c_tot 2.c_tradepartn 3.c_tb 4.c_arggdp 5. c_realwage 6. c_fordebt 7. c_ko ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H1) Positive shocks in terms of trade positively impact Argentina's GDP 
H2) Positive shocks in the main trading partners growth positively impact Argentina‟s 
GDP 
H3) Positive shocks in the main trading partners growth positively impact real wage 
H4) Positive shocks in the terms of trade positively impact the real wage 
H5) Positive shocks in Argentina‟s GDP affects negatively the Balance of Trade 
H6) Positive shocks in the level of external debt affect negatively Argentina‟s GDP 
 
H7) Positive shocks in the capital outflow affect negatively Argentina‟s GDP 
H8) Positive shocks in the level of external debt affect negatively Argentina‟s real 
wage 
H9) Positive shocks in the capital outflow affect negatively Argentina‟s real wage 
H10) Positive shocks in the level of external debt positively impact capital outflow 
 
* In this case the cumulative response of GDP to the increase in debt is negative during the five years following the shock, and 10 years after the shock output increases in 
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Accumulated Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
